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Fundamental changes are proposed in relation to competition law in 
Europe. Professor Christopher Bovis, Jean Monnet Chair of European 
and Business law at the University of Central Lancashire, analyses 
present and future procedural competition law.
The European Union has proposed a series of fundamental changes in relation to procedural competition law. These changes would result in a 
jurisdictional shift in the application and enforcement of 
competition law from the sole and exclusive authority of 
the European Commission and the European Court of 
Justice (ECJ) to a parallel and concurrent jurisdiction with 
domestic competition authorities and national courts. At 
the heart of the Commission's proposals is the valid 
argument that its relevant department (DG Competition) 
can no longer cope effectively with the demands of the EU 
when applying and enforcing competition law. Procedural 
logistics and the administrative overload imposed on the 
Commission by the current system of notifications and 
authorisations appear to be the main driver for the 
reforms. The Commission has openly challenged the 
adequacy of procedural competition laws for the current 
and future shape of die EU and their esoteric relation with 
substantive anti-trust rules stipulated in the Treaties.
The Commission is oriented towards a decentralised 
application and enforcement of EU competition law and 
policy through a system that would replace the notification 
and authorisation of restrictive agreements with block 
exemptions. It is determined to press ahead with reforms. A 
number of member states, commentators, academics and 
practitioners view procedural changes as necessary 
modernisation of a system that was designed almost 40 years 
ago. This article analyses the Commission's reform proposals 
by assessing the current procedural competition rules and 
their impact on the EU competition law and policy
THE EU COMPETITION LAWS: ARE 
UNIFORMITY AND CENTRALISATION 
INDICATIONS OF AN IRREVERSIBLE 
TRANSFER?
The EU has designed a highly sophisticated and 
consistent anti-trust system which has relied on the 
uniform and centralised nature of the relevant rules. 
Uniformity and centralisation are essential characteristics 
of EU competition rules for a number of reasons:
(1) to penetrate effectively national legal regimes;
(2) to create a consistent body of law;
(3) to establish the supremacy principle over national 
laws;
(4) to provide for quality legal instruments that produce 
unconditional binding effects throughout the EU.
o o
The uniform nature of the European competition rules 
and their centralised application and enforcement are a 
strong indication of an irreversible transfer of anti-trust
o
powers from member states to European institutions.
THE EU ANTI-TRUST FRAMEWORK: A BRIEF 
ANALYSIS
The EU anti-trust framework is based on a delicate 
system that balances effective supervision and control of 
restrictive practices and abusive dominance against 
simplified administration. The laws carrying the EU's 
competition policy are built on a prohibition principle 
that pronounces all anti-competitive agreements between 
undertakings (cartels) void ab initio. However, when 
cartels contribute to the improvement of production or 
distribution of goods, or to die promotion of technical 
and economic progress and benefit consumers, the 
agreements which would otherwise have been void ab 
initio may be exempted by the European Commission.
The notification and authorisation process
The control of restricted agreements under EU 
competition rules revolves around a notification and 
authorisation process that validates them ex ante. The 
Commission must be notified of agreements that might 
have adverse effects on competition within the EU. Such 
agreements are deemed void from the date of their 
conclusion. Upon notification, the Commission will 
analyse the economic implications of restrictive 
agreements and will audiorise such agreements when 
satisfied that the pro-competitive elements of agreements 
outnumber the anti-competitive ones. Such an authority 
means that a restrictive agreement is deemed no longer to
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be void. This status begins at the date of notification of the 
agreement and not from the date of its conclusion. The 
Commission's authorisation is an administrative act, 
subject to the judicial review of the ECJ.
The authorisation process was put in place for three main 
reasons:
(1) the urgency of centralised logistics in awareness, 
information and market intelligence of economic 
operators within the EU;
(2) the need for legal certainty in the market place; and THE EXCEPTION PROCESS
fully-fledged individual authorisation of the agreement by 
means of a negative clearance (administrative act of 
constitutive nature subject to judicial review). They have 
served the purpose of further easing the already 
overloaded notification backlog. However, their major 
flaw is their very nature; they are not administrative acts, 
such as negative clearance decisions, and cannot be usedo '
before judicial proceedings in a way other than addressing 
the Commission's non-binding views.
(3) the importance of uniformity in application of 
competition law and policy.
However, centralisation in the application of 
competition law and policy and in particular the 
authorisation system attracted considerable criticism even 
from the early days of European integration. The main 
drawbacks of the authorisation process can be summarised 
as follows:
(1) the Commission's concerns that the notification and 
authorisation system is responsible for the leakage of 
serious violations of competition law which pass 
through the system unnoticed;
(2) the potential manipulation of the process by 
undertakings in order to avoid the jurisdictional 
competence of domestic competition authorities and 
national courts;
(3) undermined legal certainty in the market place as a 
result of the bureaucratically repetitive tasks of the 
Commission and the possibility of manipulative 
litigation blocking and exclusion of jurisdiction.
The European Commission has been aware of the above 
drawbacks of the authorisation process and the ex ante 
control of restrictive practices. It utilised the discretion 
given by the Treaty to introduce processes different to the 
notification and authorisation process, which aimed at 
reducing the administrative overloads and achieving a 
more effective supervision and control of restrictive 
agreements. As DG Competition gained experience in the 
economic assessment of notified agreements, theo '
Commission introduced a de minimis rule through theo
publication of notices. If undertakings operated below 
certain turnover thresholds within the EU and if their 
agreements had an insignificant and non-appreciable 
effect upon competition they did not need to be notified. 
The evolution of the de minimis rule has eased the 
administrative workload of the Commission. For 
notifications above de minimis, the Commission also 
introduced a process where its economic assessment of a 
restrictive agreement was communicated to the 
undertakings concerned via a 'comfort letter'. Comfort
o
letters are a swift method of evaluating the impact of a 
restrictive agreement without the need to proceed to the
The notification/authorisation system of ex ante control 
was deemed inadequate to cope with the growing 
European industrial base and its needs for 
competitiveness. Both the de minimis rule and the 
comfort letters were viewed as marginal improvements. 
The Commission was still responding to undertakings in a 
non-proactive way. Administrative workloads and the 
structural and behavioural changes of undertakings' 
relationships in the marketplace restricted application of 
EU competition law. Advanced vertical and horizontal 
relationships amongst undertakings, new ways of 
corporate interaction and an ever-growing experience and 
confidence of the Commission paved the way for the 
introduction of an exception. The exception process is 
complementary to the authorisation process. It has been 
put in place to provide for ex post exemption of certain 
categories of agreements from the prohibition principle. 
In other words, if an agreement meets certain criteria 
relating to its nature, structure and effect, it is 
automatically exempted from the prohibition principle. 
The exception process has developed from codification of 
individual authorisation decisions which reveal 
similarities. The exception process does not need any sort 
of authorisation from the Commission and is not subject 
to the judicial review of the ECJ.
The introduction of the exception process was made 
possible through a dynamic interpretation of the 
prohibition principle and a codified classification of 
individual authorisations. The Commission was able to 
provide for block exemptions of certain types of restrictive 
agreements between undertakings that fell under certain 
qualitative and quantitative criteria. Block exemption 
regulations were adopted and a considerable amount of 
restrictive agreements were brought into their remit, 
introducing an ex post control system without the need for 
notification and subsequent authorisation. The classified, 
determined and assessed types of agreements suitable for 
exception from the prohibitive nature of restrictive 
agreements also brought about an element of automation 
in the control system of anti-competitive behaviour. Such 
automation has shifted the onus of economic assessment. 
In the notification/authorisation process, it is the 
Commission's responsibility to assess the economic 
reasoning of a restrictive agreement in order to authorise
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it. However, under an exception process where the 
Commission provides the criteria for exemption in 
advance, undertakings concluding restrictive agreements 
are responsible for ensuring that their agreements fall 
under the remit of the exemption criteria.
THE COMMISSION'S PROPOSALS FOR 
REFORMING PROCEDURAL COMPETITION 
LAWS
The Commission has put forward two general options 
for the required consultation. The first covers the 
improvement of the notification/authorisation process. 
The second switches the existing procedural competition 
rules from the combined authorisation/exception process 
to a wholly exception process.
The improvement of the authorisation process
The first option can be achieved through a range of
r O O
modifications to the existing procedural rules. It has 
certain advantages which deserve careful consideration by 
member states and European institutions in the light of 
the forthcoming legislative changes. The Commission 
accepts that the credibility and coherence of EU 
competition law and policy is attributed to the 
notification/authorisation process   despite its drawbacks 
  and the centralised application and control structure. A 
competition policy is credible because it can be endorsed 
and followed by interacting businesses and it must be 
coherent, predictable and consistent. Centralisation of the 
application of EU competition law and policy has 
contributed significantly towards its credibility and 
coherence. The main reason for this is diat substantive EU 
anti-trust law is developed through a dynamic 
interpretation of Treaty provisions by the European 
Commission, and more importantly, through the approval 
of such interpretation by the ECJ and the court of first 
instance. Without the sole jurisdiction of the 
Commission, which has a high level of technical expertise 
and is guided by the judicial precedence of the ECJ, EU 
competition policy could not have achieved the same 
levels of maturity and quality.
A RULE OF REASON: EVOLUTION NOT 
REVOLUTION IN ANTI-TRUST ASSESSMENT
An important suggestion for improving the 
authorisation process is the development of a 'rule of 
reason' within the prohibition principle of restrictive 
agreements. The rule of reason is an evaluation and 
assessment by the Commission of the pro-competitive 
elements of restrictive agreements and their subsequent 
classification into broad but clearly defined categories of 
corporate behaviour. The aim is to waive their notification 
requirement and ease further the administrative duties of 
the Commission. The rule of reason can be seen as an 
expansion of the de minimis rule. Both processes, in 
principle, can result in the simplification of the
authorisation process and in a dramatic fall of the 
notifications submitted to the Commission. However, the 
rule of reason in anti-trust has a number of disadvantages. 
It could undermine the integral structure of Article 81 EC 
(control of cartels) (formerly Article 85 EC) by shifting 
the economic analysis on restrictive agreements outside 
the framework of the clearly defined existing categories of 
exception from the prohibition principle. That outcome 
appears undesirable and it might be ultra vires.
A CENTRIFUGAL AUTHORISATION 
PROCESS
This improved variation of the authorisation process 
largely accommodates the Commission's desire for 
decentralised application and enforcement of competition 
law and policy. Decentralisation of the authority to grant 
individual exemptions can be achieved by removing the 
Commission's sole jurisdictional competence to assess 
notified restrictive agreements and replacing it with a 
concurrent authorisation system based on a division of 
labour between the Commission and domestic 
competition authorities. This seems a very credible 
alternative to the substitution of sole jurisdiction of the 
Commission, while maintaining the authorisation process. 
Two ways have been forwarded in support of a 'centrifugal 
authorisation process'. The first recommends the 
substitution of the Commission's sole competence of 
assessing notifications with a process which weights the 
'centre of gravity' (the Schwerpunktheorie developed by the 
Bundeskartellampt) of restrictive agreements, in order to 
allocate the responsibility for their assessment to either 
the Commission or the competent authority of the 
member state where the centre of gravity falls.
The Schwerpunktheorie envisages an assessment of the 
potential impact of restrictive practices prior to their 
notification and subsequent authorisation. Such 
assessment process does not remove the administrative 
burden of notifications, but it distributes the workload for 
authorisation. Apart from technical issues, there is the 
question of the enforceability of decisions by domestic 
authorities authorising restrictive practices. As the law 
stands currently, administrative decisions of domestic 
competition authorities authorising restrictive agreements 
can be enforced only within the territory of the respective 
member state. A possible problem arises if the centre of 
gravity of a restrictive agreement falls under the
o J o
jurisdiction of a domestic competition authority but 
involves undertakings situated in different member states. 
A domestic decision has limited authority.
Another improvement to the authorisation process 
draws analogies and lessons from the Merger Control 
Regulation (MCR), which is based on criteria that 
determine the EU-wide or national dimension of anti- 
competitiveness. The MCR classifies mergers by reference 
to turnover thresholds. Thus, the corporate size of the
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prospective merger determines its exclusive jurisdictional 
forum of assessment. However, the jurisdictional division 
of powers based upon size criteria has a potential 
drawback: forum shopping and the so-called 
nationalisation of competition policy. The existence of 
multiple national jurisdictions and the possibility of the 
application of national laws may result in inconsistent 
decisions. This could be the start of forum shopping from 
undertakings seeking the most favourable outcome to their
o o
prospective agreement. Legal certainty would suffer and 
the credibility of the whole process could collapse. In 
addition, the jurisdictional plethora could be an incentive 
for domestic competition authorities to introduce 
domestic policy considerations in assessing anti-trust cases, 
a scenario that might lead to what the European Parliament 
described as the nationalisation of competition policy. 
Although forum shopping is a remote possibility primarily 
because of the principle of the supremacy of ELI law and 
the on-going convergence of domestic legal systems, the 
introduction of domestic priorities into the competition 
policies of member states appears a probable outcome. 
Member states, when given discretion in applying their 
own rules, have been found to depart significantly from ELI 
standards. A classical example of 'nationalised' policies can 
be found in the EU public procurement rules, where for 
decades the Commission has struggled to root out 
domestic priorities from a uniform and objective system 
used for the award of public contracts.
PROCEDURAL SIMPLIFICATION OF 
NOTIFICATIONS AND AUTHORISATIONS - 
OPPOSITION PROCEDURES
The existing procedures for notifications of restrictive 
agreements to the Commission are extremely complex and
cumbersome. Their processing, consultationr o 7
requirements, assessment, translation and publication take 
a significant proportion of the Commission's resources. 
The simplification of the procedural requirements relating 
to notifications can be further advanced by the parallel 
establishment of 'opposition procedures', as are currently 
in operation for types of restrictive agreements that fall into 
a 'grey area'. Opposition procedures give the Commission 
six months to oppose a restrictive agreement. When that 
period elapses without the Commission having opposed 
exemption, the agreement is deemed exempt. Procedural 
simplification and a widespread application of opposition 
procedures could considerably modify the 
notification/authorisation system. Their main disadvantage 
is their centralised nature and the limited opportunities for 
jurisdictional diversion to member states.
ESTABLISHING A FULLY-FLEDGED 
EXCEPTION PROCESS
The point of departure for the Commission's reform 
proposals is the decentralised application and 
enforcement of competition law and policy. For this
purpose, the current notification/authorisation process 
must come to an end. The Commission clearly favours its 
replacement with an exception process that introduces an 
ex post control system of anti-competitive behaviour. The 
Commission appears confident that its obligations for 
effective supervision balanced with simplified 
administration can be met through an ex post control 
exception system. The mature and coherent competition 
policy built up through the notification and authorisation 
process and consistently applied by the Commission can 
now be dispersed by ex post exception control. 
Undertakings would no longer have to notify agreements 
and seek authorisation; instead they have to make their 
own assessment on the compatibility of their restrictive 
agreements with EU law. The Commission claims that an 
ex post control process will relieve undertakings of the 
costly and cumbersome tasks of preparing notifications. 
However, under the new process, undertakings would 
have to take the responsibility of compliance themselves 
this will certainly cost as much as notifications. With the 
ex post control, the Commission intends to pass the onus 
of compliance to the market place, in an attempt to 
introduce a sort of self-regulation in anti-trust, where 
undertakings should themselves judge the potential 
adverse effects of their restrictive agreements.
THE END OF AN ERA: ABOLISHING THE 
COMMISSION'S EXCLUSIVE JURISDICTION 
TO PROVIDE EXEMPTIONS
The Commission proposes to relinquish its sole 
jurisdiction and competence for applying exceptions to 
the prohibition principle of EU competition law and to 
establish the parallel and concurrent competence of 
domestic authorities and national courts. This aim is the 
epitome of decentralisation in the application and 
enforcement of EU competition law and the ultimate 
objective of the Commission's reforms. Under the 
notification/authorisation process, the Commission is the 
sole jurisdictional authority to exempt restrictive 
agreements by assessing economically the pro and anti- 
competitive elements of restrictive agreements notified to 
it. Such exclusive powers preclude domestic competition 
authorities from examining restrictive agreements once 
they have been notified to the Commission. They also 
preclude national courts from proceeding with litigation 
before them.
Under the current authorisation process, the 
Commission's relationship with national courts is a 
constructive one, although it has been seriously 
constrained as a result of its exclusivity in providing 
exemptions. The ECJ has sent clear messages in 
establishing a very broad framework of co-operation 
between the Commission and national courts. The 
relationship between the Commission and national courts, 
according to the Court, should be based on the principle of 
the supremacy of EU law and the effort to avoid conflicting 11
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and inconsistent applications of EU competition law. 
However, the progress made by national courts in 
accepting their role as a parallel jurisdictional authority in 
anti-trust cases alongside the Commission has been 
disappointing. National courts, due to their general nature, 
often lack the technical capacity for the economic analysis 
required in anti-trust cases. Finally, the fact that a mere 
notification of a restrictive agreement to the Commission 
must result in the suspension of any litigation before 
national courts has a dissuasive effect upon the national 
court's wish to play an active role in the decentralised 
application and enforcement of EU competition law.
The Commission proposes the establishment of advanced 
information and co-operation procedures between itself 
and national courts to enable the latter to embrace their 
new role in anti-trust application and enforcement. Various 
models based on existing systems in domestic legal orders 
have been put forward which oblige national courts to 
supply information to the Commission every time they 
intend to apply EU competition law. This would allow the 
Commission to determine whether it wishes to intervene as 
an amicus curiae in national proceedings or to provide 
technical guidance to national courts with a view to 
maintaining consistency in the application and enforcement 
of EU competition law. Interestingly, the Commission 
might end up with notifications of litigation proceedings 
from national courts instead of notifications of restrictive 
agreements from undertakings.
Along the same lines, the Commission envisages close 
co-operation with domestic competition authorities. To 
achieve a parallel level of competence, competition 
authorities at both EU and national levels must be clear as 
to the division of labour and responsibilities amongst 
themselves. Existing guidance provides for a generic form 
of co-operation and information systems, but their main 
drawback surfaces every time the exclusivity of 
jurisdiction principle is invoked by the Commission as a 
consequence of a notification. A network of competition 
authorities, satellites to the Commission is necessary to 
replace the old system. In order to function in a 
compatible way with the Commission and within the 
proposed ex post control process of anti-competitive 
behaviour, such a network must be:
( 1 ) empowered to have concurrent competence with the 
Commission in providing individual exemptions to 
the prohibition principle;
(2) entitled to determine the compatibility of restrictive 
agreements with block exemption regulations; and
(3) authorised to pass information between their 
members, including case-files or other confidential
' o
information that might be used in national legal or 
administrative proceedings.
The establishment of a network of competition 
authorities represents an enormous task for both the
Commission and member states. Administrative 
homogeneity is a pre-requisite for the successful 
functioning of such a network, with uniform examination 
and investigation procedures providing credibility. So far, 
domestic competition authorities have been established in 
eight member states, leaving seven national
o o
administrations with the task to complete the network. 
However, it is the quality of their decisions and the 
coherence in applying existing centrally formulated 
competition policy and judicial precedence that makes the 
Commission anxious rather than their formation. Critics 
fear that fifteen, initially, domestic competition authorities 
may introduce their own public policy considerations in 
their anti-trust decision-making, resulting in inconsistento' o
and unpredictable results. The credibility of the network 
rests upon the same principles that have established the 
credibility of the current centralised policy: consistency, 
uniformity and legal certainty.
Both judicial and administrative decentralisation of 
competition law and policy reveal the need to approximate 
existing domestic legal and policy orders, as a transitional 
measure. This is necessary in order to avoid forum shopping 
and a parody of administrative decisions contradicting each 
other. Judgments by national courts, as well as decisions by 
domestic competition authorities, must produce legally 
binding effects outside the territory of the relevant member 
state. Considerable harmonisation will be required before 
the proposed decentralised system can produce outputs of 
similar quality to the existing centralised one.
AUTOMATING THE EX POST EXCEPTION 
PROCESS: MORE BLOCK EXEMPTION 
REGULATIONS
The Commission envisages adopting more block
o r o
exemption regulations to encompass new types of 
agreements suitable for ex post exception. By doing so, it 
would diminish the need for undertakings to individually 
notify their agreements to the Commission or the 
domestic competition authorities. The Commission 
somehow wants to create an automated self-regulatory 
system of anti-competitive behaviour, where law and 
policy is to be determined centrally and their application 
and enforcement dispersed peripherally.
The enactment of more block exemption regulations to 
reduce the scope for individual notifications would have a 
significant effect in the decentralisation process. 
Regulations are capable of penetrating domestic legal 
order without any administrative intervention from 
member states, thus entrusting the national judiciary with 
the application and enforcement of rights and duties 
stipulated therein.
The Commission, finally, has proposed to intensify its 
investigatory powers. Under the current process, the 
judicial co-operation of member states must be sought 
before it can commence any investigation proceedings. This
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requirement has been laid down by the ECJ in order to 
safeguard the interests of the undertakings by ensuring that 
their investigation is authentic, not arbitrary or excessive. If 
the Commission utilises its investigatory powers in different 
member states, the simultaneous co-operation of the 
respective judiciaries could pose an insurmountable 
obstacle. National judges will authorise the Commission's 
intentions to investigate undertakings in their territory 
according to their existing (national) procedural laws. 
Inevitable delays, conflicting decisions and bureaucracy 
could derail the Commission's thrust to instigate
O
investigations, by taking away any surprise element. It has 
been proposed to create a centralised jurisdictional 
authority to authorise single or multiple investigations by 
the Commission. It seems that the Commission with the 
one hand empowers national judiciaries to apply and 
implement EU competition law and with the other hand 
takes away their authority to safeguard the undertakings' 
constitutional rights prior to an anti-trust investigation. 
This should not be seen as a cynical power brokerage 
between central and peripheral anti-trust decision and 
policy making. Rather, it is an anomaly of a system in 
transition from centralised to centrifugal application.
The Commission's plan for enhanced investigatory 
powers finally include the right to summon to its own 
premises any person likely to be able to provide 
information relevant to an investigation. Similar powers 
exist in domestic competition authorities, subject to 
national procedural laws.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
This article has described the current structure of the 
application and enforcement of EU competition law and 
policy, the need for reform and the available options for 
such reforms, as well as illustrating the inherent
' o
advantages and disadvantages to these options. In the light 
of subsequent enlargement, the EU might be incapable of 
dispersing effectively its anti-trust law and policy, as the 
reactive nature of the notification/authorisation process 
and the bureaucracy associated with such process 
threatens to bring the whole system to a halt.
The procedural reforms: modernisation or 
nationalisation
The Commission's motives for modernisation of the 
procedural competition rules are genuinely pragmatic. 
Resource issues and the limited opportunity to decentralise 
the application and enforcement of EU competition rules 
appear as the two fundamental flaws of the existing 
notification/authorisation process. However, if the 
Commission wanted to, it could request more personnel, 
so its understaffed DG Competition could cope more 
efficiently with notifications and authorisation. The 
decentralisation question remains the focal point in the 
Commission's reform proposals. The only way to create a
centrifugal process of parallel competence and concurrent 
jurisdiction would be, according to the Commission's view, 
to abandon the notification/authorisation process and the 
switch to a newly established ex post exception process.
The modernisation of EU competition law and policy 
through the empowerment of domestic authorities and 
building the capacity of national courts has, apart from the 
danger of inconsistencies in decisions and judgments, a 
major disadvantage in that it introduces national policies into 
the equation. The possible nationalisation of competition 
law and policy should be a concern for European 
institutions, as the Commission's reform proposals hardly 
address the danger of national policies playing a part in 
applying and enforcing EU competition law.
Decentralisation: Ideology or necessity?
How important is decentralisation in the application and 
enforcement of EU competition law and policy? If the 
effective modernisation of EU anti-trust laws were to stem 
from the proposed adoption of an ex post control process 
because of its decentralised application and enforcement, 
then a relevant modification of the existing ex ante
o
authorisation process could also, theoretically, be capable of 
accommodating centrifugal application and enforcement.
In other words, it is not necessary to establish ex post 
control in order to achieve decentralisation. Therefore, 
decentralisation is not strictly speaking a necessary 
characteristic of the proposed ex post process, an 
assumption which reveals that the decentralisation of the 
EU competition law and policy is an ideological stance of 
the Commission rather than a necessity linked to the 
proposed ex post process.
It remains to be seen how European businesses would 
react to a decentralised ex post control of anti-competitive 
behaviour and whether the proposed changes would affect 
the confidence of the European industrial base and inhibit 
trade within the EU.
The proposals for the modernisation of Community 
Competition Law included in the White Paper have now 
been taken a step forward. A draft regulation has been 
presented by the European Commission, pointing out the 
future direction for the application and enforcement of 
anti-trust law and policy in the common market. 
Interestingly, in the proposed regulation, the Commission 
is standing strong for the basic principle which it has so 
vividly defended in the White Paper: the principle of 
decentralisation. The ideologically charged agenda of the 
Commission to establish a centrifugal anti-trust system in 
the common market is close to reality. &
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